The picture from Shenzhen makes people think of Cold War triangle diplomacy. Here are the three powers Nixon tried to play off against each other, meeting in one room. But the shape of the triangle has changed, and so has who sits at its point.
Why did Nixon want to split China from the Soviet Union?
Nixon wanted leverage over Moscow. He argued that the communist world was really two rival powers, the Soviet Union and China, and he and Kissinger decided to use that hostility to the US's advantage. The approach became known as triangular diplomacy.
Kissinger later summed up the aim in one line. The US would try to be "closer to each than they were to each other", so that the three-way relationship itself put pressure on both communist capitals.
Vietnam was the other big motive. Nixon and Kissinger made ending the war in Southeast Asia on favorable terms a key goal of the opening to China, and Vietnam came up at the February 1972 meetings in Beijing.
Why was China willing to talk?
China was afraid of the Soviet Union. In March 1969 the long border dispute turned violent when Chinese forces fired on Soviet border troops on Zhenbao (Damanski), an island in the Ussuri River. About 50 Soviet soldiers were killed. Tension stayed high until a ceasefire in September 1969. One CNA study of the clashes is titled in terms of the threat of nuclear war in 1969.
Each side wanted something different. As a Columbia University teaching guide puts it, the Americans wanted to end the war in Vietnam, while China wanted support against Soviet pressure.
Washington also had a lot to offer. It had refused to recognize the communist government since 1949 and had backed the Nationalists on Taiwan. A US veto had also kept the People's Republic out of the UN. Pakistan, a US partner friendly with Beijing, helped broker the rapprochement.
How did the triangle actually work?
The key was dealing with each capital separately, and in sequence.
- Beijing, 1971–72. Kissinger slipped away during a stop in Pakistan and turned up in Beijing in July 1971. (USHistory.org dates the trip to June.) In late 1971 China's UN seat passed from Taiwan to the People's Republic. In February 1972 Nixon became the first American head of state to set foot on the Chinese mainland.
- The Shanghai Communiqué. The visit ended with a joint statement, the Shanghai Communiqué. Its Taiwan wording, in which the US "acknowledges" that Chinese on both sides of the Strait maintain there is but one China, still underpins US policy as the first of three US-China communiqués.
- Moscow, May 1972. The opening to China worried the Soviets, as Nixon had expected. On May 26, 1972, in Moscow, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement on offensive arms, ending the first round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). They also agreed on US wheat sales and a joint space project. That project became Apollo-Soyuz, which docked in orbit in July 1975.
US records show the triangle working in practice. Kissinger relayed details of Soviet-American talks to the Chinese throughout 1971 and 1972. A February 1972 memo to Kissinger described press reports that Moscow was ready to make a deal over Vietnam to head off further Sino-American rapprochement.
What is a "reverse Kissinger"?
The phrase means flipping Nixon's move: wooing Russia away from China. Commentators came up with it, not the White House. Trump fed it, though. In an October 2024 interview with Tucker Carlson, he said he wanted to "un-unite" Russia and China. We found no formal administration strategy that uses the term.
Most of the analysis we found is skeptical. The main objection is that 2025 is not 1969. Then, Moscow and Beijing had just fought along their border. Now, Russia backs China's stance on Taiwan, and China has given material and diplomatic support to Russia during its invasion of Ukraine. An essay in the journal Survival argues that the Nixon analogy oversimplifies today's multipolar world.
The partnership has limits. One analysis notes that Moscow appears to want to formalize it, but the reluctance has come from Beijing.
So is Shenzhen the reverse of Nixon?
Not quite. Shenzhen doesn't fit the reverse-Kissinger idea, and it doesn't fit the original either. Trump met Xi and Putin one-on-one and then together, all at the same summit and on the same day. Nixon kept his visits months apart so that each capital would worry about the other. Trump also called both men friends and spoke of charting a "different course."
What Shenzhen does resemble is an idea floated in 2025 as a "double Kissinger": lowering tensions with Moscow and Beijing at the same time instead of playing one against the other. CNN describes Trump's method as more personal than strategic. He has cultivated both leaders for two years, hoping that closer personal ties lead to smoother geopolitics.
The bigger difference is who sits at the point of the triangle:
- Who called the meeting. According to the Wall Street Journal, as cited by Asia Times, Putin proposed the three-way summit in an October 9 call with Trump.
- Who hosted. Xi hosted. Before the summit, Leon Hadar wrote that in 1972 Washington was the pivot, but in Shenzhen the pivot would be Xi. In his view, Russia and China would arrive as partners and the US as "the odd man out."
- Whose message it carried. Xinhua, China's state news agency, issued the joint statement, and it echoed themes Xi has promoted, including opposition to "Cold War thinking." Xi opened by telling the others that major powers must not touch each other's bottom lines on sensitive issues.
By Kissinger's own measure, the question is whether Washington is closer to Moscow and Beijing than they are to each other. The commentary we found suggests the answer is no.
What did the summit actually produce?
So far, not much. The three leaders released a four-point "declaration toward peace" and agreed to ongoing talks on nuclear nonproliferation. They also said they would boost oil production and that "there can be no winners in a nuclear war". No diplomatic breakthroughs were announced, and a Kremlin spokesperson said Ukraine wasn't even the "central topic" of the three-way session.
What we don't know yet
We don't know whether Shenzhen reflects a deliberate strategy, such as managing the great powers together, or is mainly personal summitry. The administration hasn't spelled it out, and analysts disagree. We also don't know whether there is still enough friction between Moscow and Beijing for any US president to exploit, the way Nixon exploited the split of 1969.