In the Myanmar case, a majority of judges decided the test was met, though only by a 9–6 vote. Al Jazeera reports that this is the first time the ICJ has found a state responsible for genocide. Lawyer Toby Cadman told the outlet that proving specific intent is the hardest part of any genocide case and called it an extremely high bar. The interesting question is how the court cleared that bar this time when earlier cases failed.
What does "genocidal intent" mean legally?
It means intending to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, in whole or in part, as such. That definition comes from the Genocide Convention. The Convention also lists specific prohibited acts, such as killing members of the group. Those acts count as genocide only when they're committed with that intent.
Proving the acts is usually the easier half. In this case the court found that Myanmar's forces committed three of them: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and imposing measures intended to prevent births. The intent is what separates genocide from other mass atrocities. Mass killing or forced expulsion can be a terrible crime without being genocide.
Why does the court have to infer intent at all?
Direct evidence, like a recorded order to wipe out a group, almost never turns up. Myanmar built its defence on exactly that point. It argued there was no direct evidence of intent and that Gambia failed the pattern-of-conduct test.
So the court looks at circumstantial evidence instead: the scale of the violence, who was targeted, and how. It held that it can establish intent this way only if genocidal intent is the only reasonable inference from the evidence, and the inferred intent must explain all of the evidence taken together.
Where does the "only reasonable inference" test come from?
In Croatia v Serbia in 2015, the ICJ found that Croatia had not shown that the only reasonable inference from the pattern of conduct was intent to destroy the Croat group.
The wording itself was debated in that case. The court's 2007 judgment said "only possible inference," while the Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal had used "only reasonable inference" in its Tolimir case. Serbia argued that the two formulations were equally stringent. Either way, the bar is high. Proving that genocide is a plausible explanation isn't enough. The claimant has to rule out the other plausible explanations.
Why did earlier genocide cases fail?
They failed because the court accepted a different aim as the reasonable explanation. In the 2015 case, the ICJ found that Serb forces' conduct was best explained by an aim to force Croats out of areas to form their own state, not to destroy them. As AP put it, the court found genocidal acts but not genocidal intent.
The 2007 Bosnia v Serbia judgment did hold that the July 1995 Srebrenica killings were genocide. Before this ruling, international courts had recognized genocide only in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge.
What was different in the Myanmar ruling?
The key step was holding that genocidal intent can exist alongside other goals. The court said the test is met even if parts of the record allow other intentions to be inferred, as long as only genocidal intent can explain the totality of the evidence. It also said genocidal intent can coexist with other intentions, including an intent to forcibly displace.
This matters because Myanmar's defence relied on alternative explanations. It argued that an armed conflict or counter-terrorism operation can support reasonable inferences that do not involve genocide. The court rejected two versions of that argument. It held that Myanmar treating the ARSA armed group as a terrorist threat did not rule out genocidal intent. It also held that Myanmar's failure to use every opportunity to destroy the Rohingya did not preclude the inference.
Just Security reports that the court found the evidence excluded counter-insurgency, displacement without destruction, and collective punishment without destruction as reasonable explanations. Two features of the violence pointed to intent: the large numbers of people killed, injured or displaced, and widespread brutal attacks on women and children. Reading the judgment, President Iwasawa said the atrocities "went well beyond what would be required to punish the population".
Its finding of intent rests on inference, and that is how the test is designed to work.
What did the six dissenting judges argue?
They argued that the proof of intent fell short. The dissenters were Vice-President Sebutinde, Judges Tomka, Abraham, Xue and Nolte, and Judge ad hoc Kress. In a joint dissent, they said intent had not been established under the strict standard of proof and was not the "only reasonable inference" from the pattern of conduct. One dissent pointed to a lack of "fully conclusive" proof.
Both sides applied the same test. They disagreed about whether the evidence actually excluded the other explanations.
Did this ruling lower the bar for proving genocide?
Nobody knows yet. The dissenters said the strict standard wasn't met. Oxford's Janina Dill said the split and separate opinions highlight "the lingering doctrinal complexities" and called the ruling instructive for South Africa v Israel.
How much the "coexisting intentions" passage matters will depend on how future judges read it. Other governments were watching the legal question closely. Eleven states were allowed to intervene on how the Convention should be interpreted, including Canada, France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland.
Older explainers on the standard, such as the Sentinel Project's guide to the elements of genocide, were written before this ruling.
What happens to Myanmar now?
The ruling is binding, but the court has few ways to enforce it. ICJ judgments are final and cannot be appealed. However, the court can only report non-compliance to the UN Security Council, and it cannot prosecute individuals. Whether Myanmar complies is an open question.