The clause is back in the news because Carney keeps signing small trade arrangements with Beijing while U.S. talks stall. The week he met Trump at APEC in Shenzhen, Canada and China agreed to drop restrictions on Canadian pork and some Chinese steel. That came after January's EV-for-canola arrangement. Each new step raises the same question: at what point does Canada cross the line that lets the U.S. walk away?

The treaty text is short. A lot of the coverage of it gets the details wrong.

What counts as a "non-market country" under CUSMA?

A country has to pass two tests, both set out in Article 32.10(1). First, on the date CUSMA was signed, at least one member had to treat it as a non-market economy under its trade remedy laws. Second, no CUSMA member can have a free trade agreement with it.

China passes both tests. It's on the U.S. list of non-market economies, and taking it off would require a statutory review by the Commerce Department. The status is fixed as of the day CUSMA was signed. It isn't re-judged when a later deal comes along.

Does Canada need U.S. permission to make a trade deal with China?

No. The text has no consent requirement. It sets out a series of steps instead:

Some commentary describes the clause more strictly than the text does. David Collins of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute wrote that members are "forbidden" from a China deal without permission, but the treaty has no such rule. Global Trade Alert gets the timelines right (three months before talks, 30 days before signing) and calls the clause a "poison pill." But the exit right comes from signing an FTA. Starting talks doesn't trigger it, and neither does another member objecting.

Do Carney's China deals trigger Article 32.10?

So far, the analysts cited here say no. In January, Canada agreed to let tens of thousands of Chinese EVs in under a tariff-quota, and in return China dropped duties on canola products. Trade analyst Dade called changes like these "working arrangements to recalibrate tariffs", not an FTA. Collins, despite his reading of the clause, also concluded the arrangement wasn't meant to be an FTA. He faulted Carney for loosely calling it an "agreement."

Carney himself said Canada has "no intention" of pursuing an FTA with China or any other non-market economy. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said new tariffs would depend on a Canada–China deal going further than that pact.

Washington still pushed back. After the January deal, Trump threatened a 100% tariff on Canadian goods, and his administration suggested Canada may have violated CUSMA.

Could several small deals add up to a free trade agreement?

Nobody knows yet. Article 32.10 doesn't define "free trade agreement." No tribunal or government has said whether a string of sectoral deals, like January's EV and canola measures and November's pork and steel steps, could together count as one.

A 2019 Georgetown analysis noted that the clause refers to "free trade agreement negotiations," which leaves room for sector-specific deals that stop short of a full FTA. It concluded the clause "probably will not stop" a Canada–China deal if both countries want one.

What would happen to Canada if the U.S. used the clause?

The U.S. and Mexico would keep trading under what is essentially CUSMA, and Canada would be left out. Under paragraphs 6 to 8, the remaining members' replacement deal includes every CUSMA provision except those they agree don't apply. They use the six-month notice period to work out amendments. The new deal takes effect 60 days after the last member confirms it has finished its legal procedures.

Why does the clause matter if the U.S. can leave CUSMA anyway?

As a legal tool, it may not matter much. CUSMA already has a standard six-month withdrawal clause for any reason. Back in 2018, a CIPS analysis called 32.10 "no veto" and largely superfluous for that reason. The author also called it unclear whether ending the pact on these grounds would ever be sensible or practical for a U.S. administration.

What the clause does give Washington is a formal process and a treaty-based reason to object. With the general withdrawal right, the U.S. would need neither.

What does Washington want instead?

Something broader, judging by its other recent deals. The October 2025 U.S.–Malaysia deal lets the U.S. terminate if Malaysia signs an FTA with a country that jeopardizes "essential U.S. interests" and consultations fail. The Cambodia deal has a similar trigger for agreements that pose a "material threat." The U.S. also used similar non-market language in November 2025 framework statements with Guatemala, Argentina, Ecuador and El Salvador.

In August 2026, Carney said U.S. negotiators had language that "wanted to restrict" Canada's ability to trade with other countries, which he called "unacceptable." Canada walked away from formal U.S. talks that month. Trade lawyer Mark Warner called Carney's framing "a little disingenuous," since 32.10 already exists. He suspects U.S. negotiators tried to add Malaysia-style language. The exact U.S. wording hasn't been published.

Is Trump bothered by Canada's China deals now?

Carney says he doesn't think so. After their Shenzhen meeting, which lasted just under 20 minutes, Carney said he doesn't believe Trump is uncomfortable with Canada expanding trade with China. His office said the two leaders "agreed to continue the work." Nothing public shows that the U.S. has formally claimed a breach of Article 32.10 or that any formal notice has been given under it.